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HAGEN TRUCK LINES, 
v. 
Plaintiff/ 
Respondent, 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SHERIFF OF WEBER COUNTY, 
and WEBER COUNTY COMMISSION, 
Defendants/ 
Appellants. 
Case No. 18301 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Second District Court 
Weber County, The Honorable s. Mark Johnson, Judge 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages for negligent destruction of 
property. Plaintiff's truck was involved in an accident and 
Weber County deputy sheriffs ordered that the cargo be des-
troyed, thinking it was unsalvagable. Plaintiff claims it 
should have been salvaged. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to a jury on November S, 1981. The 
case was tried before the Honorable s. Mark Johnson, a Circuit 
Court Judge who was assigned to sit on the District Bench pro 
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tern. The jury returned a general verdict in the amount of 
$19,377.00. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the trial court judgment and 
seek to have the case remanded for a trial on the issue of 
damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the night of December 10-11, 1977, the Plaintiff, a 
trucking company, was transporting a load of meat over the 
highways of Weber County. Very early Sunday morning, December 
11, 1977, the Plaintiff's vehicle, for a reason which is not 
known, crashed through the guardrail on an overpass known as 
the Slatersville exit in Weber County. The vehicle plummeted 
over the overpass landing on the roadway beneath. The fuel 
tanks apparently burst, causing diesel fuel to be spread over 
the entire area, and to cover the vehicle and its load. The 
diesel fuel ignited, causing a very hot fire. One of the 
occupants of the truck was thrown clear and injured only 
slightly. The other occupant of the truck was trapped in the 
cab and was killed. 
The Weber County Fire Department was called to the scene 
early in the morning while it was still dark. The fire mar-
shal testified as follows: 
-2-
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Q. Could you see a truck down there under 
the overpass? 
A. We didn't--it was such a mess, we didn't 
really know what it was--it was so--such a--every-
thing was destroyed, you might say, beyond recogni-
tion. There was parts up on top of the freeway, 
there was parts on the side, there was parts down 
in the bottom. It was--it was--it was a terrible 
mess, you might say. 
Q. Can you give us an idea as to how high 
the flames were going. 
A. Oh they--they were up as high as what the 
overpass is. 
• • • 
Q. Okay. Now, was this wreckage, was it 
covered with spotty fires or was it covered with 
just one big fire? 
A. When we got there it was--mostly consumed 
the whole area. 
Record 209-210. 
The fire marshal also testified that petroleum fires burn 
at a temperature of between 500 and 1,000 degrees. (Record 
206) • 
After several hours of pumping water, the fire was finally 
extinguished. The fire marshal described the cargo after the 
fire as follows: 
It had been soaked with diesel and it was--
some of it, like I say, had been burned. Some of 
it was--well, a lot of it had been burned. A lot 
of it, all of it probably had been soaked with 
diesel. 
-3-
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Q. 
recall? 
A. 
How much of it had been burned, do you 
Oh, the majority of it. 
Q. Did you notice that it had a plastic bag 
around each piece? 
A. Yes. • • • 
Q. What can you tell me about the condition 
of the plastic bags? 
A. Not very good because they had been burn-
ed, consumed, the major portion of thern--practical-
ly all of them, because of the diesel and then the 
fire. 
The accident was investigated by the Weber County Sher-
iff's Department. The person in charge of that investigation 
was Deputy Mike Schlosser. Schlosser testified that at about 
6:30 a.m. the truck occupant's body was finally found. By 
that time the fire was substantially extinguished. At about 
7:00 a.m. Schlosser met with his superior, Sergeant Hackworth 
and the person who was in charge from the fire department to 
decide what to do with the cargo. Schlosser testified as fol-
lows: 
Q. What was that decision? 
A. It was a joint one, joint decision, that 
from the intense amount of heat that had been in-
volved and the great amount of water that had been 
used, the condition of how the cargo was laying 
strung around the area, that we knew this--the 
vehicle was a total loss, and we felt also that the 
meat would be impossible to salvage. 
Record 17. 
-4-
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The county road crews were then instructed to dispose of 
the cargo at the county landfill. Schlosser then went to the 
hospital to interview the driver of the truck. Schlosser tes-
tified that the driver was somewhat groggy and could not recall 
the name of the trucking company that owned the vehicle and the 
load. The driver told him that it was his first trip with this 
company (Record 22-23). 
Schlosser had found a telephone number, however, on a slip 
of paper when he had been digging through the cargo looking for 
the truck's occupant. Through a series of phone calls, he was 
finally able to identify the owner of the truck. He told them 
that their truck had been involved in an accident, that one of 
their drivers was dead and another was hospitalized, and that 
the truck and its cargo were thoroughly destroyed. 
He was told that someone from the trucking company would 
come to Salt Lake as soon as possible. 
Early that afternoon, representatives of the trucking com-
pany arrived in Salt Lake City. After viewing the accident 
scene and what was left of the truck, they went to the Weber 
County landfill to inspect the cargo. The men arrived at the 
Weber County landfill just as it was getting dark. Plaintiff's 
representative, Mr. Hicks testified about his inspection as 
follows: 
Q. Okay. Did you make an inspection of the 
cargo at that time? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And could you outline for us what you did? 
A. Well, at the time it was getting dark 
out, but I didn't go down into the trench. There 
was a trench dug there. The area that the meat was 
in was roughly 30 feet long, about 10 feet across, 
about 6 feet deep. There was also a number of dead 
animals at the dump. The meat was--had been thrown 
on top of this, dumped on top of some of these ani-
mals. Alongside of it. I didn't go down into the 
dump. I made a general inspection of it. I did 
take out a number of pieces of meat and set them on 
the outside of the dump. Those meat--pieces of 
meat, I found cartons which had been crushed down, 
but were--they did look in kind of bad shape, but 
when I pulled the box open, the insides of the 
boxes were relatively clean and the meat was intact. 
Q. Was there any diesel oil or fuel on it? 
A. Those particular pieces there were not. 
Then because it was getting dark and it was getting 
difficult to see what we were doing there, we left 
for the evening. And the next morning I rented an 
automobile and drove out there early in the morning 
because I wanted to make a closer inspection, find 
the product I did Sunday afternoon. 
Q. 
made? 
Can you tell us about that inspection you 
A. Well, that product was in very good con-
dition. The poly bags were not ruptured on it. It 
did not have any contamination on the meat. The 
insides of the boxes were relatively clean, though 
from the outside it did not have that great of an 
appearance. So I wanted to go out and make a bet-
ter inspection of it the next day, which I did. I 
went out on the Monday morning, and at that time I 
got back down to the dump again, and I went from 
one end of it to the other as far as meat, and I 
rummaged through 150-200 pieces of meat trying to 
get an idea of what kind of percentage was reus-
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
able. And then after that I did set some of that 
outside the dump and one of those pieces was re-
turned for laboratory examination. • • • 
Q. When you came to make your further inves-
tigation the next day, can you tell us what you did? 
A. At that time basically I did three 
things: I--first I went back down to the dump, and 
I did a full visual inspection of it, trying to 
take in everything that I could find that was not 
covered up. The second thing I did, I got down and 
dug through the stuff, and this is when I inspected 
approximately 150-200 pieces of meat, moving about 
by hand. I did this in the dump. And then I--the 
last thing I did, I removed several more pieces to 
the outside of the dump, and one of those pieces is 
what I took with me back to Ogden to have it--used 
as a sample for testing. 
Q. Okay. On the basis of that investiga-
tion, did you come to any opinion as to how much of 
the meat was salvageable at that time? 
Mr. Daniels: Would you caution the witness, 
your Honor, that that can be answered yes or no as 
to whether he can form an opinion. 
The Witness: Yes 
The Court: All right, the answer is yes. 
Mr. Winegar: Yes, and what is that opinion? 
Mr. Daniels: Objection, ·your Honor, I think 
it lacks foundation and is calling for total specu-
lation. 
Mr. Winegar: Your Honor, I think we have 
qualified him. He handles 200 of these cases a 
year. That he's had both on the killing floor--
The Court: Well, he may answer to the meat 
that he inspected, but as to the percentage, that 
portion of the entire load, I don't think that 
would be proper, if your question is worded as such. 
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Mr. Winegar: Okay. Let's word it that way. 
Of the approximately 150-200 pieces that you in-
spected at that time and the Monday morning in the 
trench, can you give us your opinion as to what 
percentage of those that you did inspect to be sal-
vageable? 
A. For human consumption, I'd say 40 percent. 
(R. 97-98: 101-102). 
This was the only evidence relating to damages. 
ARGUMENT 
DAMAGES WERE NOT PROVED TO A SUFFICIENT 
DEGREE TO ALLOW THE JURY TO BASE AN AWARD 
ON ANYTHING OTHER THAN SPECULATION. 
Plaintiff's only evidence concerning damages is found in 
the testimony of Mr. Jerry Hicks. Mr. Hicks testified that he 
had inspected from 150 to 200 pieces of meat. He said of those 
that he inspected, 40 percent could have been used for human 
consumption. He did not testify as to the entire cargo load, 
but only to the 150 to 200 packages he inspected. The court 
sustained an objection to the question relating to the entire 
cargo and allowed Mr. Hicks to testify only as to the packages 
which he inspected. 
Neither Mr. Hicks nor any other witness testified that the 
150 to 200 packages that were inspected were similar to or rep-
resentative of the entire cargo. 
-8-
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There must be some evidence upon which a jury can base a 
verdict for damages. Here the critical link is missing. Even 
Mr. Hicks' testimony as to the pieces he examined is a gross 
approximation, but the uncertainty here goes to the weight of 
the evidence and can be considered by the jury. Where there is 
absolutely !!2. evidence that the meat that he inspected bears 
any resemblance to the part that he did not inspect, there was 
no evidence upon which a jury could base a verdict regarding 
the rest of the load. The court should have instructed the 
jury in accordance with Defendants' proposed jury instruction 
as follows: 
You may not award damages of a speculative 
nature. Plaintiff's investigator testified that he 
examined from 150 to 200 packages of meat. Should 
you determine that damages should be awarded, you may 
award damages based only upon the damage to this 
amount of meat, the damage to the remainder being 
speculative. 
The rule for determination of damages is clearly recognized 
and is reasonably consistent in most jurisdictions. The Utah 
court has stated the rule to be as follows: 
Where a rule of law has been established for the 
measurement of damages, it must be followed by the 
finder of fact, and to recover damages plaintiff must 
prove not only that she suffered a loss, but must 
also prove the extent and amount thereof. Further-
more, to warrant a recovery based on the value of the 
property there must be proof of its value or evidence 
of such facts as will warrant a finding of value with 
reasonable certainty. 
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Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P.2d 597 (1962). 
The cases uniformly hold that although the plaintiff need 
not prove damages with mathematical precision, damages cannot 
be based on mere speculation or conjecture. 
In this case, the trial court apparently changed his posi-
tion during the course of the trial. Although he did not allow 
the jury to hear evidence of damage to the entire cargo, he 
allowed the jury to assess damages to the entire cargo. Mr. 
Hicks was asked his opinion as to the portion of the cargo 
which was salvageable for human consumption. The trial court 
did not allow Mr. Hicks to testify as to the entire cargo, but 
only as to the 150 to 200 packages that he examined. There was 
no other evidence about whether any of the remainder of the 
cargo was salvageable. Mr. Hicks was not asked if he had an 
opinion as to whether the packages that he examined bore any 
resemblance to the remainder of the cargo. We can speculate 
that he would have answered in the affirmative and that the 
pieces that he inspected were similar in composition to the 
remainder of the cargo. We can just as well speculate that he 
would have answered that the 150 to 200 pieces that he inspect-
ed were selected from a portion of the cargo which was not 
burned as badly. At this point it is impossible for the court 
to say what Mr. Hicks' testimony would have been. 
-10-
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The jury had no way of knowing what portion of the remaind-
er of the cargo was salvageable and could have based its deter-
mination on nothing but speculation. 
The trial court's decision to allow the jury to assess dam-
ages for the entire cargo was based on the case of Sparks v. 
Ballenger, 376 S.W.2d 955 (Mo. 1964). That was a case where 
the plaintiff was involved in an automobile accident and was 
injured. While being taken in the ambulance he was involved in 
a second accident and suffered further injuries. There was 
substantial evidence that one of the plaintiffs had suffered an 
injury to his knee that he did not sustain in the first colli-
sion. There was evidence that his wife did not sustain any 
cuts or bruises about her face or head in the first collision, 
but she did sustain them in the second collision. Physicians 
had testified that pre-existing injuries were aggravated. The 
court instructed the jury that the mere fact that damages may 
not be calculated with absolute certainty or exactness is not a 
bar to recovery. 
Obviously, this Missouri case is correct. A plaintiff 
should not be barred from recovery merely because he cannot 
calculate the damages with certainty or exactness. In every 
personal injury case involving future losses or the determina-
tion of an award for pain and suffering, damages cannot be com-
puted with precision. But the case is not authority for the 
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proposition that an action should be submitted to the jury for 
a determination of damages when there is no evidence as to the 
amount of damages. The plaintiff is always required to produce 
some substantial evidence to give the jury a basis for making 
an award. 
Another case involving a second injury is Scott v. Rainbow 
Ambulance Service, Inc., 452 P.2d 220 (Wash. 1969). In that 
case the plaintiff was injured when she fell on a sidewalk. 
While being transported to an ambulance, the attendant let her 
fall out of a stretcher and she was further injured. The court 
applied the long standing rule where two injuries have occurred 
the plaintiff has the burden of segregating the damages from 
each. The court dismissed the case after the plaintiff's open-
ing statement when her attorney admitted that he could not seg-
regate the damages. 
The Scott case really applies the same rule as the Missouri 
Sparks case, and which is applied routinely in this state: the 
plaintiffs must show by a preponderance of the evidence insofar 
as reasonably possible, which of the injuries were probably 
attributable to the first accident and which were probably at-
tributable to the second accident. 
In this case this was done for the 150 to 200 packages of 
meat which were examined. Damages could not be calculated with 
-12-
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precision or certainty as to these packages. The Plaintiff's 
investigator, based upon his experience, gave his opinion as to 
a probable proportion, but no evidence was presented as to the 
remainder of the load. 
It is also significant to note that there is no evidence 
the Defendants in any way created the problem which made ascer-
tainment of damages difficult. After the truck accident, the 
meat was a smoldering mess on the roadway. In order to ascer-
tain damages, an investigator with a knowledge of meat would 
have had to go through the meat in sufficient detail to form an 
opinion as to its condition generally. Had the meat been moved 
to another location, Plaintiff's investigator would have had to 
go through the same procedure. At the Weber County landfill he 
would have had to do exactly the same thing and was not pre-
vented from so doing. The fact that he chose to inspect only 
150 to 200 packages of meat was his own decision. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case the trial court ruled that Plaintiff had not 
established sufficient foundation for his expert to testify as 
to the damages caused to the entire cargo. Consequently, the 
court allowed the expert to testify only as to 150 to 200 pack-
ages of meat which he examined. Rather than remaining consis-
tent with this position, however, the trial court then allowed 
the jury to assess damages as to the entire cargo load. 
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There was no evidence upon which a jury could have 
legitimately assessed damages as to the portion of the load 
which was not inspected by Plaintiff's expert. The case should 
be remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this -2S day of June, 1982. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By: 
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